Foreclosures of single-family mortgages have increased dramatically in many parts of the U.S. in recent years. Much of this has been tied to the rise of higher-risk subprime mortgage lending. Debates concerning mortgage regulation, as well as debates about other residential finance policies and practices, hinge critically on the social as well as personal costs of loan default and foreclosure.
Introduction
In March 2000, Mayor Richard M. Daley of Chicago held a press conference in front of a boarded-up brick bungalow on Chicago's southwest side to announce a proposed ordinance aimed at reducing mortgage foreclosures in city neighborhoods (Washburn, 2000) . The mayor compared the "menace" of abusive mortgage lending and resulting foreclosures to the problem of criminal street gangs. He went on to say that "vacant buildings are ugly. They attract gangs….They are the most frequent problems encountered by the (community policing program) and by block clubs and community organizations" (Spielman, 2000) . In the next few months, a high-profile series of six murders in abandoned buildings in one South Side neighborhood brought increased attention to the problem of abandoned buildings. By September, the city had passed the first municipal ordinance in the country aimed at reducing predatory lending. Supporters of the law continually referred to the scourge of abandoned buildings stemming from high-risk home loans as a principal reason for passing the law.
Community concern over the problem of boarded-up and abandoned buildings, many of which stemmed from increased mortgage foreclosures, provided important political support for passage of the city's hotly contested predatory lending ordinance.
Certainly concern for the more direct victims of predatory mortgages and the other effects that blighted buildings may have on a community played a role as well, but the notion that such buildings lead to increased crime was a critical factor. Yet despite the clear convictions of the mayor and many other policymakers and community groups around the country that vacant and abandoned homes can lead to crime, the systematic research in this area is quite scarce. In fact, we are aware of only one study that systematically links abandoned buildings to crime and none that measure the effect of foreclosures on crime. Spencer (1993) found that crime rates on blocks with open abandoned buildings were twice as high as rates on similar blocks without open buildings.
In this paper, we seek to measure the effect of foreclosures of single-family homes on levels of violent and property crime at the neighborhood level. We do not suggest that any effect of foreclosures on crime is more important than other harm that foreclosures might cause. Effects on the directly affected households as well as other neighborhood impacts (e.g., aesthetics, stability, or property value) may be as or more important than any effects on crime. However, effects on crime are clearly of concern, especially in many of the neighborhoods that have been hit hard by the growing levels of foreclosures in cities across the U.S.
The Foreclosure Problem
Nationally, foreclosure levels in the U.S. have generally risen significantly since the 1970s. During the 1980s, foreclosure rates on conventional loans rose significantly from about 0.3 to 0.4 percent up to levels of around 0.8 percent by the end of the decade (Elmer and Seelig, 1998 
Subprime Lending and Increasing Foreclosures in Urban Areas
The problem of high foreclosure levels in recent years has been linked to the increasing activity of subprime mortgage lenders that specialize in lending to borrowers with imperfect credit. A number of studies have identified some relationship between subprime lending and foreclosures at the neighborhood level (Burnett, Herbert, and Kaul, 2002; Collins, 2003; Gruenstein and Herbert, 2000; Newman and Wyly, 2004 and that the rate at which subprime loans entered foreclosure in late 2003 was more than 10 times the rate for prime loans.
Foreclosures, Boarded-Up and Abandoned Homes, and Physical Disorder
Before analyzing the effect of foreclosed homes on neighborhood crime, it is important to place this research in the context of a substantial literature on the effect on neighborhood crime of what sociologists refer to as social and physical disorder. Vacant and abandoned buildings are often considered a component of neighborhood physical disorder (as opposed to social disorder). Physical disorder involves "signs of negligence and unchecked decay" in a neighborhood (Skogan, 1990, p. 4) . Physical disorder refers more to sustained conditions than to particular events. However, these conditions are, of course, created by events and actions. Moreover, Skogan (1990, p. 36) suggests that physical disorder is more often caused by legal, if destructive, actions by perpetrators rather than by criminals or offenders. Social disorder, on the other hand, is composed of specific undesirable events and behavior (e.g., aggressive panhandling or public drinking)
that may in turn cause more serious problems, including crime, although this causation is disputed (Sampson and Raudenbush, 1999) .
Several observers and researchers have argued that physical and social disorder causes crime (Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1991) . They argue that disorder undermines the ways in which communities maintain social control.
Fewer residents are concerned about or take responsibility for disorder in public spaces outside their own households. Criminals flock to such communities because they do not fear being caught. Thus, social and physical disorder leads to more serious criminal acts.
However, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) argue that disorder is not typically a cause of crime, but that many elements of disorder are a component-perhaps not always well measured-of crime itself. Moreover, they argue that physical disorder, such as smashed windows and drug vials in the streets, is evidence either of crime or violations of ordinances.
Given this definition of physical disorder, vacant and abandoned houses should be seen as a phenomenon distinct from disorder. While some vacant or abandoned homes may be in violation of housing ordinances, the conditions of the homes are rarely caused by the violations. While such buildings may be the result of illegal activity or social disorder on the part of those having some physical presence in the neighborhood, they are generally unlikely to be. An act of arson can result in abandonment if the owner of the victimized house lacks adequate insurance. However, if a homeowner suffers a crisis of some kind and cannot pay her mortgage, her home may be foreclosed upon and the house may become vacant and then perhaps boarded up and eventually abandoned. While the effect of this calamity is to increase neighborhood blight, the causation is quite external and not caused by local crime, ordinance violations, or social disorder. It may have more to do with a layoff at an employer far from the neighborhood. Likewise, if an abandoned building results from a foreclosure due to a high-risk subprime mortgage loan, no local crime or ordinance violation was instrumental in creating the problem. Skogan (1990) argues that abandoned buildings can harm a neighborhood in different ways. First, they can harbor decay. They may be havens for trash, rats, or other stray animals, squatters, or even criminals. Abandoned houses may also be used as places where drugs are sold and used or used by predatory criminals who may attack neighborhood residents. Finally, abandoned or vacant homes may be targets of vandalism, the theft of wiring or other building components, or arson. However, property theft from such buildings may be less likely to be reported than theft from occupied buildings. Indirectly, the presence of boarded-up and abandoned buildings may lead to a lack of collective concern by neighborhood residents with neighborhood crime.
5.

Methods and Data
To identify the effect of foreclosures on neighborhood crime, we begin by attempting to estimate neighborhood crime rates by the following equation:
where lnC i is the natural log of the number of crime incidents in census tract i, which will later be disaggregated into violent and property crime. P i is the population of the tract, B i is the number of businesses in the tract, and Z i is a vector of resident characteristics that might be expected to affect neighborhood crime rates based on the literature. F i is the tract foreclosure rate, measured by the number of foreclosures divided by the number of owner-occupiable housing units in tract i.
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While some attempts to estimate neighborhood crime levels use per capita crime rates as the dependent variable (Kubrin and Squires, 2004) , we prefer a specification that begins with the absolute value of crime incidents as a function of both population level, the number of businesses, and characteristics of the population. First, violent crimes occur against those who work as well as those who live in neighborhoods. Neighborhood retail centers and business clusters are frequently crime "hot spots." In the case of property crime, we might expect the number of businesses to be an especially strong factor. Ideally, we would have additional information on the businesses, particularly total number of employees in the tract, but such data are not available at a census tract level.
The dependent variable is transformed as the log of the raw crime figure because the crime figures are substantially skewed in their distribution. Logging these variables creates dependent variables that follow the normal distribution much more closely, fulfilling an important assumption of ordinary least squares regression. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 compares the distribution of total crime and the log of total crime.
Coincidentally, the resulting semilog functional form provides for a convenient interpretation of the coefficients of the independent variables. That is, the coefficients represent the percentage change in absolute crime levels for a one-unit change in the independent variable.
To estimate equation (1) Table 1 gives the mean and standard deviation of the dependent and independent variables used in estimating equation (1). Table 2 gives the Pearson correlations between the dependent variables and each of the independent variables. As expected, population and number of businesses are positively correlated with crime levels, although the correlation between number of businesses and violent crime is quite weak. This is somewhat expected because businesses are a major target of property crime. Many of the demographic variables are significantly correlated at substantial levels with violent crime.
These variables include proportion of female-headed households, percent black, proportion on public assistance, median family income (negative sign) and, importantly, foreclosure rate. The correlations with property crime are smaller and generally at lower significance levels. Of course, these are just simple bivariate correlations and tell us relatively little about how foreclosure rate or any of the other variables independently affect crime.
Ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate equation (1) with all of the independent variables listed in Table 2 . However, in examining the partial regression plots for all independent variables a significant nonlinearity was identified for the residential population variable. Figure 2 is the partial regression plot of the total crime residual versus population, together with a fitted quadratic curve. It demonstrates the nonlinear nature of the impact of population on the dependent variable. To correct for this, we add the square of population as an independent variable. This improves the regression fit significantly (from R-square = 0.717 to R-square = 0.750). Table 3 gives the results of the estimation of equation (1) for all three dependent variables (violent crime, property crime, and total crime) with the square-of-population included along with the original independent variables listed in Table 2 . As predicted by the examination of the partial plots, the sign of the coefficient for population is positive, but for population squared it is negative. Therefore, crime incidents increase with population but increase at a slower rate at higher population levels. This nonlinearity appears to be somewhat stronger in the case of violent crime than in the case of property crime.
The nonlinearity in the effect of population on crime may be due to a problem of crime occurring to employees working in what are essentially nonresidential tracts or some other phenomenon. For example, tracts with larger populations may have more street activity or "eyes on the street," providing a deterrent to crime (Jacobs, 1961).
As anticipated, the number of businesses in a tract has a significant effect on crime rates. The marginal effect is substantially larger for property crime than for violent crime. Standardized coefficients suggest that variations in business counts are a substantial determinant of property crime (beta = 0.237) and also affect violent crime levels in a nontrivial way (beta = 0.119).
Six of the demographic characteristic variables are statistically significant determinants of neighborhood violent crime. These include percent black, percent Hispanic, the proportion below poverty, the proportion of families headed by single females, the proportion renting, and the proportion that have moved in the last five years.
The signs of all of these variables are as expected. Four demographic characteristics are statistically significant determinants of neighborhood property crime, including proportion divorced, proportion that have moved in the last five years, percent Hispanic, and percent black. Again, the signs are as expected.
The key variable of interest here is the foreclosure rate variable. This variable is a statistically significant determinant of violent crime but not of property crime. Partly because property crime figures are higher than violent crime figures, the variable is also not significant in the total crime regression. The foreclosure rate is significant in the violent crime regression and not in the property crime regression due to the much larger magnitude of the coefficient in the violent crime result (2.328 versus 0.084).
The nature of the semilog functional form makes the interpretation of the effect of higher foreclosure rate on violent crime relatively straightforward. The coefficient gives the percentage change in violent crime given a one-unit increase in the independent variable. Because a one-unit change in the independent variable is absurdly large (the standard deviation is only 0.0287), we instead consider the expected change in violent crime due to a one-standard-deviation change in the independent variable. A 0.0287 increase in the foreclosure rate yields an expected increase in violent crime of 6.68 percent. A smaller increase in the neighborhood foreclosure rate, of say 1 in 100
properties, would yield an increase in violent crime of 2.33 percent.
Concerns about Multicollinearity
Although not examining the role of foreclosures, Kubrin and Squires (2004) find a similar estimation of neighborhood crime rates in Seattle to be afflicted by problems of multicollinearity and employ principal components analysis to reduce the number of independent variables. Therefore, when estimating equation (1), we examined diagnostics for collinearity quite carefully. While we found significant bivariate correlations among some of these variables, multivariate collinearity diagnostics did not suggest that collinearity was a major problem. Variance inflation factors were examined and none exceeded 7 before the square of population variable was added. Even after this variable was added, all variance inflation factors remained under 10 and most remained under 5.
Moreover, the regression was re-run using standardized independent variables to compute a collinearity condition index. The condition index was less than 10 even after the square of population variable was added. Thus, the diagnostics did not suggest that multicollinearity was a serious problem, and no data reduction techniques were used.
Checking for Possible Simultaneity
Another possible concern with the results in Table 3 is that the model used may ignore simultaneity between foreclosure rate and crime. That is, we examine whether violent crime could cause higher foreclosure rates as well as the other way around. If simultaneity occurs, the results in Table 3 would result in biased coefficients. To address this potential problem, we conduct a Hausman test for simulataneity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991, pp. 303-05) . To do this, we first need to identify an instrument that is significantly correlated with the foreclosure rate but that is uncorrelated with the residual in the results of the regression from Table 3 . A variable that meets these criteria is median home value. This variable is negatively correlated with foreclosure rate (-0.395) and uncorrelated with the regression residual. Once we have this value, we regress the instrument and the exogeneous independent variables (excluding foreclosure rate) on foreclosure rate. We then take the resulting residual and include it as an additional independent variable in the estimation of tract crime (equation 1). The results (shown in the Appendix) of this exercise show that the residual does not come in as a statistically significant predictor of tract crime (significance level equals 0.317). This means that there is no evidence that simultaneity is a problem in the results in Table 3 .
Conclusions and Implications for Planning and Policy
The problems of foreclosures are certainly not limited to their impact on crime.
Foreclosures can harm the financial standing of a family, can leave the family without ready or quality shelter, and can have other negative impacts. Foreclosures might also make neighborhoods less appealing for reasons of aesthetics or affects on property values that have nothing to do with crime. Boarded-up buildings due to foreclosures may weaken the commitment of residents to a neighborhood and weaken their interest in reinvesting in their property. But the concern over foreclosures in many communities lies in part with their effect on the safety and security of the neighborhood. More research is needed on any additional social or economic costs of foreclosures.
This study finds that higher neighborhood foreclosure rates lead to more neighborhood violent crime at appreciable levels. While the effect on property crime is not found to be statistically significant, the coefficient in the regression is positive.
Moreover, property crime related to boarded-up or abandoned homes resulting from foreclosures may be less likely to be reported than property crime occurring in occupied properties. More research is needed on the relationship between foreclosures and property crime.
A one-percentage-point (0.01) increase in foreclosure rate (which has a standard deviation of 0.028) is expected to increase the number of violent crimes in a tract by 2.33 percent, other things being equal. A full standard deviation increase in the foreclosure rate, other things equal, is expected to increase violent crime by 6.68 percent.
These findings suggest that foreclosures may have important social and economic consequences on neighborhoods beyond effects on the finances of households directly affected by the foreclosure. An increase in violent crime is an important social cost -as well as an economic cost -that must be incorporated into policymaking concerning real estate and mortgage lending policies and regulation.
In particular, previous research has shown that subprime mortgage lending leads to foreclosures at much higher rates than prime lending (Immergluck and Smith, 2005; Quercia, Stegman, and Davis. 2005) . This is the first study that systematically estimates the effect of foreclosures -many of which followed from subprime loans -on neighborhood crime rates. While the results estimating the effect of foreclosures on property crime are statistically inconclusive, the results for violent crime are significant.
A Hausman Test for Simultaneity
In the model described in equation (1), there may be a concern about reverse causality. That is, there may be a concern that crime, in fact, causes foreclosures as well as the other way around, a problem referred to as simultaneity. Crime, for example, may encourage homeowners to flee neighborhoods without paying off their loans, increasing foreclosure levels. If simultaneity occurs between crime and foreclosures, ordinary least squares would not accurately measure the effect of foreclosures on crime. If simultaneity is a problem, then, in addition to the relationship hypothesized in equation (1), the complete model would require the incorporation of a second equation explaining the effect of crime on foreclosures, such as:
where Xi is not correlated with the error term, ε, in the estimation of equation (1). X i is an instrument used to adequately identify the model. X i must be correlated with foreclosures, but not with the residual in the regression estimating equation (1). A variable that fulfills these criteria is the median housing value of the census tract. It is negatively correlated with foreclosure rate but not correlated with the residual of the crime estimation.
To test for simultaneity with respect to the log of crime variable, we regress, in a first stage, foreclosures on all the other independent variables in equation 1, plus the instrument (median home value):
Then, in a second stage, we include ω, the residual from the estimation of equation (3), as an additional independent variable in the estimation of a modified equation (1). This is done to "correct" for simultaneity (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p. 305) . Thus, we expand the original model as follows:
If ω i is statistically significant in the estimation of equation (1a), then we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no simultaneity. However, as shown in Table 4 , the results of estimating this new equation (shown for the log of violent crime, since that is the significant result in Table 3 ) indicate that this is not the case. The null hypothesis that there is no simultaneity can be rejected at any reasonable p value. Thus, there is no evidence of simultaneity. 
